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Abstract
Our systematic literature review aims to survey
research on regulatory and security standard requirements as addressed throughout the Software
Development Lifecycle. Also, to characterize current research concerns and identify specific remaining challenges to address regulatory and security
standard requirements throughout the SDLC. To
this end, we conducted a systematic literature review (SLR) of conference proceedings and academic
journals motivated by five areas of concern:
1. SDLC & Regulatory Requirement 2. Risk Assessment and Compliance requirements 3. Technical Debt 4. Decision Making Process throughout
the SDLC 5. Metric and Measurements of found
Software Vulnerability.
The initial search produced 100 papers, and our
review process narrowed this total to 20 articles
to address our three research questions. Our findings suggest that academic software engineering
research directly connecting regulatory and security
standard requirements to later stages of the SDLC
is rare despite the importance of compliance for
ensuring societally acceptable engineering.

1.

Introduction

Software Engineers that create and maintain the
software in regulated industries must demonstrate
regulatory and security standard compliance. Unfortunately, regulations and security standards often
contain ambiguities, conflicts, and multiple valid
interpretations, making demonstrable compliance

URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/70861
978-0-9981331-4-0
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

Aaron K. Massey
University of Maryland, Baltimore County
akmassey@umbc.edu

challenging. Industry is interested in managing regulatory compliance, as evidenced by the fact that
29% of new cybersecurity funding addresses new
or changing regulatory requirements [1]. We, as researchers, need to take a step back and assess where
we stand in assisting the software engineering community in becoming more compliant. How much
academic research is there in regulatory and security
standard compliance?
Our systematic literature review (SLR) aims to
survey research on regulatory and security standard
requirements as addressed throughout the Software
Development Lifecycle. Also, we seek to characterize current research concerns and identify specific
remaining challenges to address regulatory and security standard compliance throughout the SDLC.
This SLR consists of peer-reviewed articles published over the past 20 years, focusing on five areas
of concern: F1: SDLC & Regulatory Requirement,
F2: Risk Assessment & Compliance requirements,
F3: Technical Debt, F4: Decision-Making Process
throughout the SDLC process, and F5: Metric and
Measurements of Software Vulnerabilities. These
concerns motivate our research questions:
RQ1: What does the academic literature say about
Regulatory Compliance (RC) throughout the
Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC)?
RQ2: What does the academic literature say
about Security Standards compliance (SSC)
throughout the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC)?
RQ3: What does the academic literature say about
the cost and benefits of Regulatory and Security Standard compliance?
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Our initial search produced 100 papers for manual review (See Section 3.2). Through our search
and selection process (See Figure 1), we then narrowed our selections to 20 papers that addressed our
three research questions.
Our findings suggest that academic software engineering research directly connecting regulatory
requirements to later stages of the SDLC is rare despite the importance of regulatory compliance for
ensuring societally acceptable engineering. Security
standard compliance produced similar findings to
regulatory requirements with the later stages. The
literature suggests that the SE research community
does not consider regulatory or security standards
compliance to be a primary, motivating research
concern during the latter stages of the SDLC. This
differs from industry concerns and spending practices. We describe these findings and limitations
in further detail in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. Section 6 summarizes this work and makes
recommendations for future research.

2.

Related Work

A few other researchers have studied the SE
literature on topics related to regulatory and security standard compliance or propose models to trace
regulatory compliance throughout the SDLC. For
example, Otto and Antón examine research efforts
from 1957 to 2007 “in modeling and using legal text
for system development” [2]. The authors’ section
on “The Nature of Regulation” examines characteristics of regulations, citing the challenges and
other applicable factors that we discuss in Section 4.
Other secondary studies do speak to our concerns,
which we will now discuss.
Meidan et al. reviewed papers on software quality measurement methodologies, providing insight
into evaluation and testing research [3]. However,
this secondary study did not find any research on
regulatory compliance and very little on security
compliance, focusing overall on Software Development Process improvement.
Romanosky et al. conducted empirical research
on privacy data breach litigations involving information and communication technologies [4]. The au-

thors investigated “the characteristics of data breach
litigation and the outcomes of these cases” [4]. They
also provided their coding, which inspires our examination of costs and benefits from case law as
applicable to our third research question.
Spanos and Angelis produced another study that
we found useful on the “economic consequences
of security incidents” [5]. They focused on the aftereffects of decisions, not regulatory and security
compliance during software development. Their
work motivates researchers seeking to develop software development techniques to address compliance
problems.

3.

Method and Data Collection

Systematic literature reviews (SLRs) examine
the body of literature on a particular subject to understand the state of the subject’s research, and identify
gaps within a body of research [6]. By identifying
gaps through SLRs, researchers can identify and
promote needed research in a particular field. We
use Kitchenham and Brereton’s model [6] for this
systemic literature review. In this section, we describe the methods for reviewing articles for this
SLR and addressing our research questions.

3.1.

Objective and Research Questions

We used a Goal-Question-Metric (GQM) [7] approach to survey research on regulatory and security
requirements as addressed throughout the SDLC,
characterize current research concerns, and identify
remaining challenges from the academic viewpoint.
Our three research questions based on this goal are
as follows:
RQ1: What does the academic literature say about
Regulatory Compliance (RC) throughout the
Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC)?
RQ2: What does the academic literature say
about Security Standards compliance (SSC)
throughout the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC)?
RQ3: What does the academic literature say about
the cost and benefits of Regulatory and Security Standard compliance?
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RQ1 seeks practical insight into published
academic views on regulatory compliance in the
SDLC, including discussion of regulatory compliance, defining the characteristics of regulation, tracing regulatory requirements, and addressing compliance levels. RQ2 extends RQ1 into industry security standards because they are often legally binding
through regulatory requirements to meet a baseline
standard of care. Security standards are also commonly referenced explicitly as exemplars in regulatory compliance scenarios. RQ3 examines decision
models of compliance with regulatory and security
standards using a cost and benefits framework. Our
approach to RQ3 focused on tradeoffs framed using
technical debt or risk management to understand
the SE practitioner’s management of regulatory and
security standard compliance throughout the SLDC.

3.2.

Search and Selection Process

Our search and selection process consists of
three passes (shown in Figure 1). With each pass,
we narrow our selection of articles and map our final
selection from our areas of concern to one or more
research questions.
Stage 1: Search and Selection – 1st Pass.
Our search queries centered around our five areas of concern, using the following search string:
S1: Software Development AND Regulatory Compliance OR Industry Security Standard
S2: Software Development Lifecycle AND Regulatory Compliance OR Industry Security Standard
S3: Software Development AND Decision Making
OR Decision Models
S4: Software Development AND Technical Debt
We used these External Scholarly Search Engines: IEEE Explore, ACM Digital Library,
Springer Nature, and Science Direct to search for
articles. Our search query applied two auto-search
filters: peer-reviewed publications (Conference or
Journal) and publication date (1999–2019) incorporating two exclusion criteria (See Figure 1, Process
1.0). We manually excluded papers not written in

Table 1. Author and Keywords Snowballing

Search Results
ID

Focus Area

Author

Keywords

F1:
F2:
F3:
F4:
F5:

SLDC
RA & Comp. Req.
Technical Debt
Decision Making
Measure and Metrics

3
1
11
1
0

3
12
0
5
10

English and those with less than ten “cited by” references with exceptions made for publications after
2015.
After our initial screening process (Process 1.0),
we reviewed the title and metadata of each candidate
article against our inclusion criteria (See Process
2.0). We were looking for articles on the following
topics: Requirements Engineering and Software Development (21 found), Technical Debt (23 found) &
Decision-making within the SDLC (12 found), Risk
Assessment or Regulatory Compliance (22 found),
or Metrics/Measurements assessments on Software
Vulnerabilities (22 found).
Once an article passed the “Filter for Inclusion”
Process, we downloaded the full-text article and organized them under our Areas of Concern. Some
articles overlapped multiple areas of concern, so we
reviewed their abstracts and organized them under
their most relevant topic. We also deleted any duplicate articles from our downloaded selection. Prior
to the second pass review, the total was 100 articles.
We used reverse snowballing to narrow our selections rather than increase our references (See Figure 1, Process 3.0) [6]. The reverse snowballing process started with a compiled list of authors1 based
on some pre-reviewed articles related to Regulatory
Compliance within Software Development. We applied this list to our 100 papers, which narrowed
our papers from 100 to 16. Using the 16 articles
as a reference, we compiled a list of common tags
1 For completeness, the list is as follows: T.D. Breaux, M.J.
May, C.A. Gunter, I. Lee, P.N. Otto, A.I.Anton, J.C. Maxwell,
P. Swire, J. Hayward, S. Ghanavati, R.L. Rutledge, J. Camp,
B. Boehm, G. Boella, C. Seaman, Y. Guo, S. Spiekermann, N.
Ramasubbu, C.F. Kemerer, F. Shull, E. Shihab, G. Boello, P.
Ohm, Z. Zazworka, N. Zeni, L. Mich, and T. Valentien
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External Search
Engines

Search Terms
and Criteria

44,420 Articles
in Search
Results

Second Pass
5.3

1.0
Search for
Articles

5.1

Apply RQ
Metrics
(See Table 2)

Filter for
Inclusion

16 Articles

First Pass

5.2

Exclude
Articles that
don’t map
to a RQ

30 Articles
2,274 Candidate
Articles
2.0
Filter for
Inclusion

6.0
47 Articles

100 Downloaded
Articles

16 Selected
Authors

30 Articles Selected
by Tags
4.0
Review
Abstracts

30 Articles
Third Pass

7.3

7.2

7.1

Apply RQ
Metrics
(See Table 2)

Map to RQ
using Metrics
(See Table 2)

11 Articles

3.0
Reverse
Snowballing
(Exclusion)

Review
Full Text

Exclude
Articles that
don’t map
to a RQ

20 Articles
20 Articles Included
After Full Screening

Figure 1. Data Flow Diagram for Search Process

(23 total2 ) to review the other 84 articles within our
100 downloaded articles. From the 84 articles, we
selected 30 of those articles, for a total of 46 articles
for Abstract Review (Process 3.0) and completing
our first selection pass. Table 1 maps the number of
articles to their respective areas of concern.
Stage 2: Review Abstract – 2nd Pass.
The “Review Abstract” process began with finding articles that addressed our three research questions. First, we want articles discussing a clearly regulated domains. For example, any industry where
companies must comply with rigid regulatory re2 For completeness, our tag list is as follows: security, software
development, software development standards, security standards, requirements/criteria, requirements engineering, software
lifecycle/SDLC, compliance, legal compliance, legal requirements, regulatory compliance, regulation/law, technical debt,
technical debt management, system development, auditing, governance, software engineering, risk/costs, risk management, decision making/decision models, cost-benefit/cost-risk analysis,
traceability/Software traceability

quirements by considering fundamental limitations
within the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC)
process. Second, we did not want articles that did
not reference or discuss regulatory compliance or
security standard compliance. Third, we wanted
studies that looked at the costs and benefits of compliance or security standard implementation to support our third research questions, focusing on rationale for technical debt accrual or risk management
decisions balancing the risk of vulnerability to short
term benefits or opportunities. Lastly, we did not
want to look at pattern analysis or identification
of vulnerabilities for software exploitation because
these topics are outside the purpose of this SLR.
Inclusion criteria for RQ1
IC1: Views on RC throughout the SDLC (Challenges within Industry)
IC2: Defining the characteristics of Regulation
IC3: Traceability of regulatory requirements
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IC4: Levels of Regulation Compliance
Inclusion criteria for RQ2
IC1: Views on industry security standard compliance (i.e., challenges within industry)
IC2: Defining characteristics of security standards
IC3: Risk management process as a method of tracing security compliance
IC4: Technical Debt (TD) management as a
method of tracing security compliance
Inclusion criteria for RQ3
IC1: Quantify the risk of non-compliance to regulatory or security standards
IC2: Decision Models if TD
IC3: Discussing TD Management
IC4: Views stakeholder roles on cost and benefits
of technical debt, RC, & security std
Based on our inclusion criteria, we reviewed
the remaining 46 articles (See Figure 1, Process
4.0), mapping them to the research question the
article addressed (Process 5.1). The second pass
excluded 16 articles, leaving 30 articles for the fulltext review.
Stage 3: Full-Text Review – 3rd pass.
In this stage, we conduct a full-text review to
determine whether an article addresses our research
questions using the Inclusion Criteria outlined in the
previous stage. For example, Otto and Antón’s article provided specific descriptions on the characteristic of regulations “that make them both useful and
difficult to apply to design methodologies”. They
also surveyed efforts to handle legal texts for regulatory compliance and presented academic viewpoints
such as regulation ambiguity as an issue for compliance [2]. We included this paper because it realizes
three of our four Inclusion Criteria for RQ1.
The article by Izurieta et al. is another example
included in this survey. This paper quantifies “Technical Debt associated with security issues” using
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) or Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS).3 Quantifying technical debt as it relates to a security vulnerability can prevent foreseeable exploits [8]. We
3 CWE or CWSS is a standard for weakness identification,
prioritization, mitigation, and prevention efforts in risk management [8].

coded this article to RQ2 and RQ3 because CWSS
is a methodology for tracing security compliance
and Technical Debt and Risk Management.
After completing the full-text review and article mapping, we excluded 11 articles did not address a research question (See Figure 1, Process
7.3), but added a reference (i.e., [9]) based on an additional review of the technical debt sources which
was mapped to RQ3. A total of 20 papers addressed
our three research questions out of the 100 initially
selected papers and the one (i.e., [9]) added in the
third pass. Table 2 shows our final selection of
included articles and the research questions they
address.
Table 2. Included Articles
Citation
Garg and Camp [10]
Otto and Antón [2]
Izurieta et al. [8]
Ramasubbu et al. [11]
Laukkarinen et al. [12]
Parsons et al. [13]
Lim et al. [14]
Maxwell et al. [15]
Beach et al. [16]
Cristina-Clara et al. [17]
Velasco et al. [18]
Parent and Reich [19]
Maxwell et al. [20]
Ramasubbu and Kemerer [21]
Regan et al. [22]
Trektere et al. [23]
Falessi et al. [24]
Maxwell and Antón [25]
Seaman et al. [9]
Ramasubbu and Kemerer [26]

4.

RQ1

RQ2

RQ3

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

!
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

!
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Results

Our “Search and Selection” Process, identified
20 articles as addressing our three research questions on regulatory and security standard compliance (See Table 2). In this section, we will discuss
the papers included in the study, provide examples
of selected articles, how we map them to a research
question, and our overall findings for each research
question.
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4.1.

RQ1: Regulatory Compliance

We found 11 articles that discussed regulatory
compliance against our inclusion criteria for RQ1.
We included articles focusing on RC [2], [12],
[15]–[18], [20], [25] and articles that highlight RC
throughout the SLDC [13], [18], [22], [23]. However, only finding 11 articles points to a concern
regarding the RC research body of work: How can
practical insights into RC be examined if little published research is out compared to other research
areas? Most of the RC articles included are requirements engineering articles (i.e., eight out of 11).
Traditional software engineering (SE) techniques
(i.e., Waterfall) only focus on regulatory compliance
as part of the SDLC’s requirements phase. We assumed with other development techniques (DevOps,
Agile, Continuous Integration), we would find more
RC research within the SDLC’s design, testing, deployment, and maintenance phase. It seems that the
SE academic community treats regulatory compliance as a concern exclusive to requirements engineering and does not push more for accountability
throughout the SDLC process. That said, we found
some articles that present RC research addressing
the later stages of the SLDC. The next couple of
paragraphs discuss examples from the included papers.
Velasco et al. presented a web compliance framework for developers to promote their framework for
Web Engineering as a form of traceability and verification to regulation (RQ1, IC3) [18]. They aim to
support quality assurance and overcome “deficiencies of existing evaluation tools” to ensure the successful implementation of Rich Internet Application
that is web compliant. We found their work related
because they defined web compliance engineering
by describing its challenges at a multinational level
(RQ1, IC1), as seen in the excerpt below:
“Web Compliance Engineering as the application of quality assurance testing and
management processes and principles that
ensure conformance of Web applications to
standards, policy environments, and other
ad-hoc quality criteria. . . Web compliance
is becoming overwhelmingly complex, especially for multinational organizations,
which must comply with many local policy

environments” [18]

Regan et al. outlined the challenges of traceability requirements within medical device standards,
which must comply with FDA regulations and may
also require compliance with the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). They
highlight the definition and identification of requirements for traceability through each phase of the
software development lifecycle (RQ1, IC1–3):
“Software traceability is central to medical device software development And essential for regulatory compliance. . . However,
the requirement for traceability through the
software development life-cycle is not as
obvious in the regulations” [22]

They also mention ambiguity in the context of
regulation (RQ1, IC1), previously seen in other articles (e.g., Otto and Antón [2]). They also propose
a model for traceability to show due diligence for
regulatory compliance (RQ1, IC3).
We assumed some of the literature would examine processes, tools, and techniques for tracking
partial compliance and measuring progress towards
complete compliance. However, none of the articles included for a full text review discussed these
topics as outlined by our fourth inclusion criteria
for RQ1. An organization’s ability to account for
current levels of regulatory compliance in their software development process speaks to their ability to
understand the challenge of regulatory compliance.
The old adage from Lord Kelvin is relevant: “If
you cannot measure it, then you cannot improve it.”
Software processes that can account for and measure regulatory compliance, whether in the form
of equally-valued items on a checklist or through
some risk analysis of costs and benefits, would be
more mature than those that cannot. The fact that
this SLR did not find academic work relevant to this
effort is concerning, particularly given the increasing complexity of regulations that apply to software
systems.
Collectively, the articles we found summarize
the SE community’s academic views on regulatory
compliance. First, the SE community relies on regulation to provide general guidance. Then, the SE
community develops strategies and policies to track
and show compliance as expressed in software re-
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quirements within their SDLC process. The SE academic community clearly discusses the challenges
of complying with regulation. Foremost among
these challenges is that regulatory guidance for engineering is general, ambiguous, and has not addressed gaps in a fast-changing field.

4.2.

RQ2: Security Std. Compliance

To address RQ2, we found 12 out of the using the inclusion outlined previously. Five of these
12 overlap with the articles meeting the inclusion
criteria for RQ1, indicating that these authors are
explicitly addressing both regulatory compliance
(RC) and security standard compliance (SSC). This
aligns with the view that security standards are often
used by regulators and policy makers when crafting regulations and regulatory guidelines. PCI DSS
compliance is a good example. HIPAA also explicitly refers to industry standards. Trektere et
al. points out “the challenge that MMA [Mobile
Medical app] software development companies face
when they want to market an app is the adherence
to the large number of regulatory requirements specified in various international standards” [23] However, we separated this research question because
security standards do not necessarily address RC.
They often exist for reasons other than regulatory
compliance. As Laukkarinen et al. put it:
“Numerous industrial fields – including for
instance automotive, space, and medical
devices – require reliability, visibility, and
traceability of the software project to ensure
high quality, safety, and trustworthiness of
the software.” [12]

The cost of cyberattacks cost firms on average
US$13 million, but the actual costs to any given
firm may vary significantly [27]. Firms are unsure
how much to spend to mitigate this threat and where
to direct it to get the best value for their security
budget [27]. We wanted to see how SE academia
was addressing this critical need. To that end, our
inclusion criteria for RQ2 explicitly focus on security standard compliance separately from regulatory
compliance. (Also, RQ3 emphasized management
by also looking at Risk and Technical Debt management when it comes to security standard compliance

and traceability.) We did this because we wanted
a better understanding of decision-making models
and management of SSC, exemplified by work from
both Garg and Camp and Lim et al.
Garg and Camp examine how heuristics and biases can better support decisions in the design of
security technologies using a behavioral approach
and framing [10]. This paper was included based
on IC 3. They point out that “security investment is
a definite expense of time and money (i.e., a loss),
while the risk of not investing in security is a probable loss” [10]. They explored leadership’s or management’s decision-making process within security
compliance by considering their view point of the
probable risk of vulnerability exploitation versus
lost opportunity gains due to delays to market. It
also accounted for quick and dirty heuristics and
biases that can affect rational decision making in
security design and development.
Lim et al., we included based in IC 4. They conducted an interview study to characterize technical
debt by asking software practitioners to define it and
provide contextual examples of it [14]. This example of how practitioners view and manage security
gives insight into the balancing of opportunity and
risk within software development. For example, consider how participants dealt with other stakeholders
in the development process [14]:
“Many participants also found that management didn’t recognize the value in addressing technical debt unless doing so provided management with a tangible reward
or the customer was paying for it. Similarly, customers weren’t easily convinced to
allow the development team time to repay
its technical debt unless they could derive
business value from doing so.” [14].

Addressing RQ2 was more difficult than RQ1
and RQ3. The literature on security standard compliance overlaps with the topics of regulatory compliance and risk and technical debt management. We
show the overlap in Table 2 (e.g., in the table, five of
the 12 RQ2 articles also mapped to RQ1, and eight
of the 12 mapped to RQ3). This overlap may be a
limitation related to the framing of RQ2. However,
it may also be that academics view security standard
compliance as a mixture of regulatory compliance
and risk or technical debt management.
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4.3.

RQ3: Costs and Benefits

Thirteen of the 20 articles that received a full
text review addressed RQ3 based on our inclusion
criteria. We separated this question from the other
two to take a closer look at decision-models and
management from a cost versus benefit standpoint.
Decisions regarding technical implementation of
regulatory compliance objectives and security features are necessarily related to the costs of development for the system as a whole. The balancing of
opportunities against risks bears a critical relationship to compliance. Understanding this relationship
is what motivated us to ask RQ3 separate from RQ1
and RQ2.
As with RQ1 and RQ2, we mapped the related
articles to RQ3 based on the inclusion criteria (See
Table 2). We looked for quantitative and qualitative
factors in decision-making that affect how the SE
stakeholders manage technical debt or balance opportunity and risk in software development. Quantitative examples include the cost of non-compliance
in the form of regulatory or government fines, court
costs, or drop in stock prices and qualitative being
articles that considered non-numerical factors such
as customer satisfaction and software maintainability. For example, Maxwell and Antón sought to
“present a production rule framework that software
engineers can [use] to specific compliance requirements for software”. They motivated this work in
part with the example of the data broker, ChoicePoint, which had a data breach in 2006 that cost the
company 25 million US dollars to show how costly
non-compliance can be to a software development
company and reasoning to adopting a systematic
framework [25].
Ramasubbu and Kemerer’s 2014 case study
serves as a qualitative example [21]. They examined
the cost and benefits of 69 customers adoption of
added functionality of a commercial enterprise software package over the software package’s ten-year
lifespan [21]. Early adoption of software features
took on more technical debt with higher customer
satisfaction ratings but had lower long-term software maintainability. Late adoption had the reverse
effects:

Similarly, the late adopter behavior of
avoiding immature (“beta”) features and
custom modification of features can be interpreted as the costs of avoiding technical
debt (or perhaps as accumulating a “technical credit”). The cost of avoiding technical
debt manifests itself in poor customer satisfaction scores before takeoff. However,
the strategy of avoiding technical-debt pays
off in the longer run in terms of significantly higher software quality of the package throughout its lifespan and further endows a customer with the ability to continue
adding features at a faster pace during the
later stage of the package’s life-cycle.” [21]

The SE communities views on decision factors
and design throughout the SDLC have implications
for regulatory compliance. Most articles identified
in this SLR do not quantify this relationship or directly account for it in their implementation decisions. The articles identified also do not examine
the severity of the risk of non-compliance as part of
standard development practices or whether SE stakeholders can effectively assess and manage the risk
of non-compliance. Some of the articles assessed
and used in this SLR describe a framework for managing these tradeoffs. However, these frameworks
focus more on tracing previous decisions regarding
regulatory compliance requirements than they do
in reassessing compliance in a changing domain or
evaluating previous decisions (i.e., technical debt)
for regulatory implications.

5.

Limitations

One of the main limitations of this study was
the focus on published SE academic views rather
than SE industry views. Not including SE industry
views has the potential for bias within this study. For
example, they may cite academic research that we
would find relevant. That said, we chose to focus on
academic literature for two reasons. First, academic
publications are easier to search and identify given
academic publication databases. Second, private
industry does not commonly discuss regulatory or
security standard compliance because discussing
their weaknesses in regulatory compliance may be
a competitive disadvantage.
We also limited our survey to a 20 year publication timeframe. We wanted to review the literature
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holistically, rather than focus on the most recent research trajectory, to understand where the research
in regulatory and security standard compliance has
been. We felt that anything beyond 20 years would
not be relevant to the research field today. However,
these assumptions to limit the scope of this work.
A methodological limitation is selecting candidate articles as depicted in Figure 1 described in
the Section 3.2. Our first pass systematically incorporated exclusion criteria that cut the candidate
articles to less than 10% of the search queries produced. However, we may have excluded articles
that would have been deemed relevant had we conducted forward snowballing. On the other hand, our
process is more repeatable as conducted. Also, we
incorporated snowballing in the latter half of the
Stage 1 search and selection process to leverage as
many of the benefits of snowballing as possible.
The later stages (i.e., Stage 2 and 3), put more
emphasis on content and addressing the three research questions. Our final 20 article selection is
the result of wanting articles that directly discuss
regulatory and security standard compliance and
management models. However, this may mean that
our inclusion criteria were too narrow to encompass
a complete picture of approaches to regulatory and
security standard compliance. Articles that discuss
these concerns may exist and may not be included
in this study.
Finally, space limitations forced us to leave
out several example quotes from the literature that
would provide additional context regarding how researchers actively working in this area view regulatory and security standard compliance.

6.

Our findings suggest that academic software engineering research directly connecting regulatory
requirements and security standards to later stages
of the SDLC is rare despite the industry’s focus on
regulatory and security standard compliance. The
literature suggests that the SE community focuses
on other factors during the latter stages of the SDLC.
These considerations drive decision models of compliance versus non-compliance. Although the risk
of non-compliance is real and motivating, the risk
of not capitalizing on opportunities can justify shortterm trade-offs over compliance.
None of the articles we found address the challenges of bringing a non-compliant system into compliance with regulatory or security standard requirements. Further, only finding 20 articles directly relevant to our inquiry demonstrates the limited amount
of research focusing on the later stages of the SDLC
and motivates further work to build methods and
tools for tracking and demonstrating regulatory and
security standard compliance throughout the SDLC.
Although this work focused exclusively on academic research, it would be interesting to survey
industry views on regulatory and security standard
compliance. Additional research on framework and
decision-models could also help SE professionals
manage and demonstrate compliance or progress
towards compliance in their systems. Lastly, an investigation of the relationship between regulatory
and security standard compliance may prove fruitful. Twenty papers are not enough to determine the
extent to which regulatory compliance and security
standards compliance are similar or different.
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M. J. Escalona, “Measuring software process: A
systematic mapping study,” ACM Computing Surveys, vol. 51, no. 3, 58:1–58:32, Jun. 2018. DOI:
10.1145/3186888.

Page 2034

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

S. Romanosky, D. Hoffman, and A. Acquisti, “Empirical analysis of data breach litigation,” Journal
of Empirical Legal Studies, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 74–
104, 2014.
G. Spanos and L. Angelis, “The impact of information security events to the stock market: A systematic literature review,” Computers & Security,
vol. 58, pp. 216–229, 2016.
B. Kitchenham and P. Brereton, “A systematic
review of systematic review process research in
software engineering,” Information and Software
Technology, vol. 55, no. 12, pp. 2049–2075, Dec.
2013. DOI: 10.1016/j.infsof.2013.07.010.
V. R. Basili, M. Lindvall, M. Regardie, C. Seaman,
J. Heidrich, J. Münch, D. Rombach, and A. Trendowicz, “Linking software development and business strategy through measurement,” Computer,
vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 57–65, 2010.
C. Izurieta, D. Rice, K. Kimball, and T. Valentien,
“A position study to investigate technical debt associated with security weaknesses,” in Proceedings
of the 2018 International Conference on Technical Debt, ser. TechDebt ’18, Gothenburg, Sweden: Association for Computing Machinery, 2018,
pp. 138–142. DOI: 10.1145/3194164.3194167.
C. Seaman and Y. Guo, “Chapter 2 - Measuring
and Monitoring Technical Debt,” in Advances in
Computers, M. V. Zelkowitz, Ed., Elsevier, Jan.
2011, pp. 25–46. DOI: 10 . 1016 / B978 - 0 - 12 385512-1.00002-5.
V. Garg and J. Camp, “Heuristics and biases: Implications for security design,” IEEE Technology
and Society Magazine, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 73–79,
2013. DOI: 10.1109/mts.2013.2241294.
N. Ramasubbu, C. F. Kemerer, and C. J. Woodard,
“Managing technical debt: Insights from recent
empirical evidence,” IEEE Software, vol. 32, no. 2,
pp. 22–25, Mar. 2015. DOI: 10.1109/ms.2015.45.
T. Laukkarinen, K. Kuusinen, and T. Mikkonen,
“Devops in regulated software development: Case
medical devices,” IEEE, May 2017. DOI: 10.1109/
icse-nier.2017.20.
D. Parsons, T. Susnjak, and M. Lange, “Influences
on regression testing strategies in agile software development environments,” Software Quality Journal, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 717–739, Oct. 2013. DOI:
10.1007/s11219-013-9225-z.
E. Lim, N. Taksande, and C. Seaman, “A balancing act: What software practitioners have to
say about technical debt,” IEEE Software, vol. 29,
no. 6, pp. 22–27, Nov. 2012. DOI: 10.1109/ms.
2012.130.
J. C. Maxwell, A. I. Antón, and P. Swire, “A legal
cross-references taxonomy for identifying conflicting software requirements,” IEEE, Aug. 2011. DOI:
10.1109/re.2011.6051647.
T. Beach, Y. Rezgui, H. Li, and T. Kasim, “A rulebased semantic approach for automated regulatory
compliance in the construction sector,” Expert Systems with Applications, vol. 42, no. 12, pp. 5219–

5231, Jul. 2015. DOI: 10.1016/j.eswa.2015.02.
029.
[17] A. M. Cristina-Clara, E. D. Canedo, and R. T. de
Sousa Júnior, “A synthesis of common guidelines
for regulatory compliance verification in the context of ict governance audits,” Information Polity,
vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 221–237, Jun. 2018. DOI: 10.
3233/ip-170059.
[18] C. A. Velasco, D. Denev, D. Stegemann, and Y.
Mohamad, “A web compliance engineering framework to support the development of accessible
rich internet applications,” ACM Press, 2008. DOI:
10.1145/1368044.1368054.
[19] M. Parent and B. H. Reich, “Governing information technology risk,” California Management Review, vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 134–152, Apr. 2009. DOI:
10.2307/41166497.
[20] J. C. Maxwell, A. I. Antón, and P. Swire, “Managing changing compliance requirements by predicting regulatory evolution,” IEEE, Sep. 2012. DOI:
10.1109/re.2012.6345793.
[21] N. Ramasubbu and C. F. Kemerer, “Managing technical debt in enterprise software packages,” IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering, vol. 40,
no. 8, pp. 758–772, Aug. 2014. DOI: 10 . 1109 /
tse.2014.2327027.
[22] G. Regan, F. McCaffery, K. McDaid, and D. Flood,
“Medical device standards’ requirements for traceability during the software development lifecycle
and implementation of a traceability assessment
model,” Computer Standards & Interfaces, vol. 36,
no. 1, pp. 3–9, Nov. 2013. DOI: 10.1016/j.csi.
2013.07.012.
[23] K. Trektere, G. Regan, F. McCaffery, D. Flood,
M. Lepmets, and G. Berry, “Mobile medical app
development with a focus on traceability,” Journal
of Software: Evolution and Process, vol. 29, no. 11,
e1861, Mar. 2017. DOI: 10.1002/smr.1861.
[24] D. Falessi, M. A. Shaw, F. Shull, K. Mullen, and
M. S. Keymind, “Practical considerations, challenges, and requirements of tool-support for managing technical debt,” IEEE, May 2013. DOI: 10.
1109/mtd.2013.6608673.
[25] J. C. Maxwell and A. I. Antón, “The Production Rule Framework: Developing a Canonical Set
of Software Requirements for Compliance with
Law,” Proceedings of the 1st ACM International
Health Informatics Symposium, 2010.
[26] N. Ramasubbu and C. F. Kemerer, “Integrating
technical debt management and software quality
management processes: A normative framework
and field tests,” IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering, pp. 1–1, 2017. DOI: 10.1109/tse.
2017.2774832.
[27] K. Bissell and L. Ponemon. (Mar. 2019). “The
Cost of Cybercrime,” [Online]. Available: https:
/ / www . accenture . com / us - en / insights /
security/cost-cybercrime-study.

Page 2035

